Nigeria and the challenge of terrorism

“You could say Boko Haram is
everywhere, or you could say it’s
nowhere: both would be correct.”
This apparently confusing
observation about the Nigerian
militant Islamist group from one
local expert is actually more helpful
than it seems.
Responsible for a string of violent
attacks in Nigeria that have killed
some one thousand people over the
last two years, Boko Haram, which
means “Western education is
forbidden”, has been bewildering
and surprising to security specialists
here. Ask some, and you will hear
that the organisation is a threat to
the very unity of Nigeria. Ask others,
and you will hear that it is not an
organisation at all.
And, yes, they are both right.
Unspinning the complex and
contradictory web of Boko Haram
reveals four key threads.
First, taking in the historical
perspective, it is a fundamentalist
revival in northern Nigeria. Like
other such movements, it rejects
modern narratives and seeks to
apply what it sees as traditional
religious answers to all social
questions. The term “Boko Haram”
does not adequately capture their
thoughts on Western education:
they are not against Western
technology and technical learning,
but they lament the perceived
deterioration of morals unleashed
by Western influence. In other
words, it is fine to use a laptop to
access the internet as long as you
are reading what they see as
acceptably wholesome things.
Second, it is a political movement,
which is really called Jama’atu Ahlis
Sunna Lidda’awati Wal-Jihad (People
Committed to the Propagation of the
Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad), not
Boko Haram. This political side,
apparently split into at least three
factions, is not afraid to use violence
to achieve its aims. Those goals are
both long-term, like instituting their
version of strict sharia law in
Nigeria, and also more immediate,
like pushing for the release of their
members in prison.
Their grievances against the police
are particularly deep-seated. Not
only are many of their followers
locked up, their leader, Mohammad
Yusuf, was killed in police custody in
2009, and that, perhaps more than
any other single event, drives the
group — sometimes also known as
the “Yusufiyah” — in its violent
campaign, with police stations a
frequent target.
Fears of connections to outside
terrorist groups like Al Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb and Al Shabab,
should not be overblown. Islamic
militancy and extremism in northern
Nigeria have always had external
connections and linkages, but this is
predominantly a Nigerian
phenomenon. A few members may
have received training abroad, but it
probably contains few if any foreign
fighters. This sect has a well-
developed domestic bomb-making
capability now, as the frequency of
deadly explosions and the discovery
of bomb factories demonstrate. And
despite allegations of arms
streaming south from post-Qaddafi
Libya, adherents are able to source
small arms from corrupt security
services with relative ease.
Third, “Boko Haram” is an ideology
providing inspiration to some
Nigerians living in grinding poverty
under a set of rulers who concern
themselves not with running the
country but with simply stealing the
country’s oil wealth. It passes no
Nigerian’s notice that decades of
official plunder have left what
should be a thriving — or at least
developing — nation in a pitiful state
of neglect. Illiteracy stands at 40 per
cent, and poverty is rising, with 100
million people, or 61 per cent of the
population, now living in absolute
poverty on less than $1 a day.
Despite petroleum’s billions, citizens
have to cover all their basic services
themselves: health, education and
security.
Like other political and armed
movements that have sprung up in
this country, including the recent
fuel subsidy protests that brought
the country to a standstill, Boko
Haram is just a symptom of the
crumbling Nigerian state. Of course,
despite their daily trials, the vast
majority of Nigerians do not turn to
armed militancy, of the Islamist
variety or any other, but the fact
that a small and very deadly portion
do is a clear sign of the country’s
basic underlying dysfunction.
Finally, “Boko Haram” is also a cover
for criminal activity and political
thuggery of all sorts. Anything that
turns violent can be blamed on the
Islamist movement, whether it has a
link to it or not. It is a perfect alibi,
one that prevents further
questioning. Bank robbery? Boko
Haram. Attack on political
opponents? Boko Haram.
As such, the name is ceasing to
have any meaning at all: Boko
Haram is everywhere and nowhere
at the same time.
The hype in much of the Nigerian
media also contributes to the
problem, as many media outlets
chasing sales seem all too willing to
fall for unsubstantiated rumour and
outright lies proffered by political
trouble-makers — or by nobody at
all. Of course, some international
media reporting has also been more
scare-mongering than substance,
presenting this as a new terrorist
threat to the West, when it is
fundamentally a Nigerian issue.
The Boko Haram phenomenon, in all
its threads, has captured the
imagination of the entire nation,
filling newspaper pages and air time
with fear and misinformation that
reaffirms everyone’s core
understanding of their deeply
dysfunctional state: Nigeria is
broken and headed toward the
brink.
It is hard to imagine a state that is
so much a part of the problem
effectively dealing with it. Still, the
dozens of security experts,
academics and journalists I met with
all agreed on the basic elements to
address the four interlocking parts
of the Boko Haram phenomenon.
The criminal side of everything
claiming to be, or claimed to be,
Boko Haram needs to be handled as
criminal cases. This requires a non-
rapacious police force and
independent judiciary. Every aspect
of the police needs reforming:
recruitment, training and
management. With the reputation
of the police at rock bottom, even
practical intelligence gathering
within the community is extremely
difficult in the absence of trust.
Other internal intelligence agencies
have competent hands, apparently
doing their job professionally, but
they are routinely undermined by
undue political interference and
rampant politicisation of their data.
Added to that, information sharing
between security agencies seems to
be limited at best, and many
suspect that intelligence is often
withheld or fabricated to boost
agencies’ claims for greater slice of
the budgetary pie.
All that would be a huge set of tasks
for Nigeria to overcome in its current
condition. It may seem unlikely
enough, but sadly, it is hardly all
that is required.
To counter the recruiting potential
of violent movements in Nigeria, not
only Boko Haram, the country has
got to address rampant corruption
and pour the oil wealth into
government services rather than
officials’ overseas bank accounts.
Otherwise, the very word “state” will
have no meaning at all, and people
will continue to seek other solutions
to help organise their society and
support their lives, with some using
violence to achieve those aims.
The idea that Nigeria, failing its
people on so many fronts and with
too many looters posing as leaders,
could achieve all this seems almost
fanciful. The far more likely scenario
is continued deterioration on all
fronts and a disastrous military-first
approach to the insurgency that
only drives more young men to grab
a gun or build a bomb.
Still, as impossible to achieve as a
comprehensive good governance
solution may seem, it is also by
common consent here the only
thing likely to work. If there is any
optimism in this generally dismal
picture, it is exactly this: a clearly
growing consciousness that the
current situation is not sustainable
and that Nigeria needs some stiff
medicine to address not only the
symptoms of the disease like Boko
Haram, but the disease of state
failure itself.

SOURCE
[Andrew Stroehlein is
Communications Director of the
International Crisis Group,
http://www.crisisgroup.org]