Failing State, Fading Peacekeepers

Recently, this column analysed
Nigeria’s defence spending and
raised concerns about the poor
levels of equipment of our armed
forces. The write-up reflected pride
in the Army for its various peace-
keeping roles from the 1960s to the
recent ones in Liberia, Sierra Leone,
Sudan and Somalia and concluded
that our military deserved credit for
stabilizing and democratizing Sierra
Leone and Liberia in 1990s. This,
my brother Sanusi Lamido Sanusi
once tragically observed, is a
peculiar Nigerian tendency of
exporting what we lack (like true
democracy, internal security), while
ironically importing what we have in
abundance (like petroleum
products)!
Since publication, I have received
diverse responses from informed
Nigerians. Many confirmed the
alarms raised about the state of
equipment in the armed forces,
while others disagreed with the
claims of Nigeria’s stellar
peacekeeping roles. The one point
of agreement was that the
deterioration of the quality of
governance in the country has
equally reflected on the
peacekeeping capacity of the
Nigerian Army and the Police. Is this
administration bent on destroying
one of the areas where Nigeria
established a global competitive
advantage?
The United Nations (UN) was formed
after World War II to “save
succeeding generations from the
scourge of war.” Peacekeeping is
undertaken under the auspices of
the UN and other regional groupings
like the African Union and ECOWAS
to end violence between contending
parties, restore peace, build social
capital and physical infrastructure
destroyed by conflict, and get the
ex-combatants to respect any
agreements and commitments
made. The UN has led nearly 50
peacekeeping operations since the
1950s, 40 of them in Africa.
Nigeria joined the UN in October
1960 and a few weeks later offered
our Army officers and men as
peacekeepers to the Congo; Yakubu
Gowon and Olusegun Obasanjo cut
their military teeth as young officers
on this mission. Since then, we have
been involved in over 20 such
operations in and outside Africa,
largely under the UN. The notable
exceptions were the ECOWAS
monitoring group (ECOMOG) which
we led in the 1990s to end conflicts
in Liberia and Sierra Leone – and
reportedly spent between US $8
and $10 billion.
The Army is hierarchically organized
starting with a ‘section’ consisting of
about ten men (and women!), with
a corporal or sergeant as section
commander. Five sections make up
a ‘platoon’ commanded by an officer
– second lieutenant to captain with a
staff sergeant as the second-in-
command. Three platoons make up
a ‘company’ of at least 90 men led
by a Major. Three companies make
up a battalion which is made up of
at least 270 infantry officers and
men, with support staff like military
police, Intelligence, medical, supply
and transport, Imam and chaplain
raising a typical battalion size to at
least 500, and as many as 1,100. A
battalion is usually commanded by
a Lieutenant-Colonel. Amongst the
various corps of the Army, the
Infantry and Armoured are
organized as battalions, while the
Artillery, Engineers and Signal Corps
are organized as regiments, so
battalions are often larger in size.
Three battalions make up a brigade
in the Infantry Corps – the heart of
the Army. The size of a brigade
differs from corps to corps,
depending on the mix of equipment
and human resources. A brigade is
commanded by a brigadier; three
brigades make up a division
commanded by a major-general.
Nigerian peacekeeping contingents
have ranged from a platoon to a
division.
The Nigerian Army’s 60,000 officers
and men are distributed across five
divisions and a special brigade. The
major equipment of the Army
include battle tanks, reconnaissance
vehicles, personnel carriers,
Howitzers, field guns and rocket
launchers, as well as anti-tank guns
and surface to air missiles. Like
every institution in Nigeria, the
levels of equipment holding and
state of preparedness of the Army
have deteriorated to a level that it
can hardly meet its constitutional
role – a decay that is directly
affecting our competitive edge in
peacekeeping roles which was one
of our few successes.
We have every reason to be proud
of our peacekeeping record. Some
of the peace keeping operations
that we have been involved include
sending a battalion to Congo
(ONUC) 1960-1964; military
observers to New Guinea (UNSF),
1962-1963; battalion to Tanzania by
bilateral agreement, 1964; military
observers during the India-Pakistan
conflict (UNIPOM) 1965-1966;
battalion and staff officers to
Lebanon (UNIFIL) 1978-1983;
battalion and staff officers to Chad
(Harmony I, via bilateral agreement)
1981-1982; brigade to Chad
(Harmony II under auspices of the
OAU) 1982-1983; military observes
during Iran-Iraq conflict (UNIIMOG)
1988-1991; division to Liberia
(ECOMOG) 1990 to date; military
observers for Iraq-Kuwait (UNIKOM)
1991, and to Angola (UNAVEM II)
1991-1992; training teams for
Sierra Leone (NATAG) 1991;
company to Angola (UNAVEM III)
1992-1995; military observers to
Namibia (UNTAG) 1989-1990; to
Western Sahara (MINURSO) 1991;
and to Cambodia (UNTAC) 1992-
1993;
We also contributed a battalion and
staff officers to Somalia (UNOSOM)
1992-1994; battalion and staff
officers to the former Yugoslavia
(UNPROFOR) 1992; military
observers to Mozambique
(ONUMOZ) 1992; a battalion to
Rwanda (UNAMIR) 1993; training
teams to the Gambia (NATAG)
1993; military observers to Aouzo
Strip (UNASOG) 1994; and to Israel
(UNTSO) 1995; and more recently
Liberia – ECOMOG where a Nigerian
general, Suraj Abdurrahman is
Liberian Chief of Army Staff; to
Sierra Leone – UNMIL; and finally
Dafur – UNAMID, which we will
discuss in some detail as it is an
ongoing operation. Our hope is that
we will learn from the current
failures to retrieve our national
image and our reputation in the
global peacekeeping community.
The achievements of Nigeria’s
peacekeepers in Africa and
elsewhere led the UN to entrusting
us the lead role in global
peacekeeping; since 1999, Nigeria’s
successive ambassadors to the UN
have chaired the UN Special
Committee on Peacekeeping. The
Head of the Darfur Mission and Joint
Special Representative (JSR) of the
UN Secretary General, Ibrahim
Gambari is Nigerian. Until 2009, my
brother and former Nigerian army
and defence chief General Martin
Luther Agwai commanded UNAMID,
and Lt-Gen Chikadibia Obiakor was
the UN military adviser on
peacekeeping operations for two
years until 2010. In UNAMID Darfur,
Nigeria was the largest Troops
Contributing Country (TCC), with
four battalions, one Military Hospital,
Military Observers, and Staff
Officers.
However, the poor equipping of our
troops has resulted in the total loss
of confidence of the UN and other
observers in the Nigerian Army. In
fact, the UN has recently questioned
the operational capacity of our
troops in Darfur. The Government of
Sudan in March 2010 and January
2012 protested to the UN Security
Council over what it considered “the
deliberate re-arming of rebel groups
in Darfur by Nigerian troops”. This
may not be unconnected with the
ease with which Nigerian troops, out
of the 53 participating armies, are
easily captured, disarmed or killed.
In the 5 years of UNAMID, Nigerian
troops have never won any fire fight
or fought back in self defence,
resulting in the highest casualty
recorded by any contingent.
In February 2010, a Nigerian
military patrol of a company
strength was intercepted by a rebel
group and disarmed completely
with their Armour Personnel Carriers
(APCs) seized without any
resistance. In January 2012, another
Nigerian patrol was waylaid by a
small rebel group and disarmed.
Apart from taking their weapons,
the commander was killed. From
these failures, the humanitarian
community in Darfur and
International NGOs prefer being by
other national troops; the Sierra
Leonean forces that were trained in
1990s by the Nigerian Army are
now more valued than our troops!
The February 2012 visit of the
American Envoy to Sudan,
Ambassador Smith to our Minister of
Defence was principally to do with
the poor performance of Nigerian
troops in Darfur. What are the
reasons for the decay of our
peacekeeping capacity? Poor
equipment, corruption, poor
personnel selection and training,
inadequate feeding and welfare of
officers and men seem to be the
reasons – symptomatic of the
general malaise in governance in
Nigeria under Jonathan.
Our equipment holdings are
disgraceful and totally
unacceptable; every country earns
money from its Contingent Own
Equipment (COE) – from uniforms,
boots, face masks, compass, rifle,
mortar, RPGs, APCs, power
generating sets, kitchen equipment
and even furniture. They are
inspected every month and
payments made, but our military
and police contingents cannot meet
up to 20% of the COE required by
the UN. Out of over 45 APCs for four
battalions of 800 troops, less than 7
are serviceable. Some of the
problems of the APCs are as basic as
batteries and tires. The equipment
available to our troops is enough to
demoralize them when compared to
other countries. The Nigerian
government is supposed to earn $
6,000 monthly for each APC. By
contrast, each Rwandese battalion
can boast of over 50 vehicles.
Rocket Propel Grenades (RPGs) is
today the weapon of deterrence to
wade off ambushes, but it is rare to
find any with Nigerian troops.
The process of selecting troops to
peace missions is also flawed. Some
battalions are loaded with clerks,
cooks, batmen and orderlies who
can barely handle a weapon, but are
well-connected! It is not unusual for
legislators, retired military officers
and traditional rulers to influence
the selection process, so
competence and capacity get
compromised. Some of these ill
trained soldiers simple take to their
heels when under attack. The end
result is the high casualty rates of
our officers and men. Similarly, poor
feeding also affects the performance
of our troops. The UN pays for the
feeding of the troops but in our
case, the money is provided to the
home government to ensure the
inclusion of local content. What is
ultimately provided by the MOD/
Presidency contractors never meets
the expected international
standards. The Rwandese
government allows the UN to
directly feed their troops and so four
Rwandese soldiers share one whole
chicken during a meal. A Nigerian
soldier is not likely to see a piece of
chicken throughout his or her six
months tour of duty in Darfur.
How is the money paid upfront by
the UN for our participation in
peacekeeping spent? Other
countries use the funds to sustain
their military and add value to their
national economies; in Nigeria, such
funds and even the income tax
deductions from the earnings of
military officers are not remitted to
the treasury but supposedly re-
channeled into the armed forces –
with no accountability! The monies
earned from peacekeeping are not
recognized as revenues, the
procurements not subject to
rigorous ‘due process’ scrutiny on
spurious security grounds and
therefore often looted by the
Ministry of Defence and the
Presidency.
Many observers opined that the
policy changes introduced by two
former Chiefs of Staff, Agwai and
Azazi to transform the army into an
American-type institution destroyed
the British military tradition of
valour, honour and integrity. These
two army chiefs between
2003-2006 introduced the policy of
achieving C+ at the staff college as
the main criterion to earn promotion
and command appointments. This
was abused and mediocre officers
were able to buy their way and
move up to command positions.
The poor performance of our troops
today is a direct consequence of
deficits in command capability.
Currently, over 90% of those who
placed Nigeria on the world map
with their extraordinary feats in
Liberia and Sierra Leone are out of
service due mainly to the C+ policy.
It is time to correct these errors,
equip our armed forces better and
restore our nation’s reputation in
international peacekeeping. It is not
too much to ask of a real
commander-in-chief.

Nasir Ahmad El-Rufai
+234 803 408 2353
elrufai@aol.com