Igbos And The Merchant Of Venice Syndrome By Nnaziri Ihejirika

The Igbo of Nigeria have
often been called the ‘Jews
of Africa’, mostly for their
business ethic, single
mindedness and
controversially, stinginess
with money. Other
Nigerians, for these
supposed qualities, have
often vilified the Igbos. The
modern Facebook and
Twitter worlds are awash
with stories of ‘greedy’ Igbo
boys and girls who will ‘do
anything for money’. It’s not
uncommon – the opposite
actually – to see social
media personalities who
label themselves
‘progressive’ or ‘activist’ join
in such denigrating
stereotypes. It’s equally
common to see other Igbo –
especially Igbo youth – join
in such generalizations or
refuse to correct such
misconceptions.
Most people are familiar
with the Shakespearean
play, The Merchant of
Venice. I read this play as a
young secondary school
student and enjoyed its
comedy and supposed
‘happy ending’, while
mentally wishing all manner
of ill-luck to the ‘bad guy’ of
the play, Shylock the Jew.
However, this play took on a
new meaning for me when I
watched a modern
production at the
Shakespeare festival in
Vancouver two summers
ago. Blessed with ten to
fifteen more years of
education and an awareness
of global issues, the
statement of the Duke of
Venice rang alarm bells in
my head. Shylock was to be
pardoned if – and only if –
he gave his possessions to
the state and more
importantly, converted to
Christianity. Conveniently
forgotten by the Duke’s
audience was the fact that
Antonio had signed an
agreement which Shylock
was abiding by, if too
harshly. Nor was the fact
that the judge in the case
happened to be the wife of
the Antonio’s best friend.
Chinua Achebe’s newly
released personal
recollection of the Nigerian
Civil War, There Was A
Country, has generated quite
a furor among Nigerians. On
the one hand, it opens up
debate on an issue that has
been festering just below
the surface of the proverbial
murky waters for the last
forty-odd years. On the
other hand, it also risks
threatening the fragile ‘unity’
and ‘trust’ that some argue
has been rebuilt between
the Igbos and other Nigerian
tribes. According to these –
largely Igbo – commentators,
Achebe is a tribalist whose
memory is faulty. Let’s
examine history to see if
these accusations have some
basis.
At the start of Nigerian
independence and in the
years leading to the first
coup, Igbos were seen to be
in the ascendancy in the
military, civil service and
educational spheres. Igbos
held the bulk of field grade
officer ranks in the army,
dominated the civil service
in two regions (East and Mid-
West), had a larger than
proportional representation
in the federal civil service
(and had significant
representation even in the
Western and Northern
region’s civil service) and
‘controlled’ 3 of the 4
universities in the country.
Declassified cables released
from UK and US intelligence
sources – as well as the
biographies of Yakubu
Gowon, Olusegun Obasanjo,
David Ejoor and Theophilus
Danjuma, all of which this
writer has read, show that
the Igbo were primed to
dominate the economic and
intellectual landscape of the
country due to their
‘progressiveness’. Note that
most present-day analysts
question whether this was
reality or borne out of tribal
fears. This is irrelevant – as
long as it was perceived, was
believed, especially in
Northern Nigeria. This also
spawned a ‘competition’
between Eastern and
Western Nigeria vis-à-vis
development, appointments
and economic opportunities.
The incidents surrounding
the mostly Igbo-led first
coup warrant their own
missive. However, it’s worth
pointing out that any coup
which sought to put a Yoruba
man – Obafemi Awolowo –
in power could not have any
overriding tribal tones. In
addition, the intellectual
epicenter of the coup was
Major Adewale Ademoyega,
a Yoruba man. This is not to
say that one or two
individual plotters did not
execute personal vendettas
against their military
superiors, some of which
may have had tribal
undertones; the fact is, we
just don’t know. Max
Siollun’s book, Nigeria: Oil,
Politics and Violence; is an
excellent historical work
which dispels most of the
myths surrounding that
period in Nigerian history
and should be read for a
broad-minded, impartial
analysis.
So how did the coup lead to
‘Biafra’?
Southern (primarily Western
intellectual and Eastern in
general) jubilation at the
deaths of the Sardauna of
Sokoto – and Premier of the
Northern Region – Ahmadu
Bello and the Premier of the
Western Region, Ladoke
Akintola (who was anti-
Awolowo and seen as a
stooge of the Sardauna);
coupled with subversive and
incendiary prodding from
British-sponsored elements
at the Zaria University (as it
was then known) led to the
first riots. This in turn
spread to other northern
cities, and has been the case
in Nigeria before then and
since, whenever Northern
citizens riot against
Southerners, Easterners –
being the most visible and
populous ‘outsiders’ – end
up bearing the brunt of such
attacks. The Head of State,
General Aguiyi-Ironsi,
despite his crushing of the
January 15 coup, was seen as
a symbol of the much-feared
Igbo domination. His unitary
decree – which among
others (and crucially) meant
that all Nigerians would be
able to compete for civil
service positions in all parts
of the country irrespective of
their region of origin – was
seen as proof of this intent.
Of course, in the rest of the
world, this is called merit,
but I digress.
These riots eventually
culminated in the counter-
coup of July 1966 when
northern officers, fed up
with the taunts and prodding
of northern elders and
masses, decided to carry out
a revenge coup, killing over
250 officers, most of Igbo
extraction. This revenge
coup spawned an even
larger wave – two more, in
fact – of what became known
as the ‘pogrom’, in which
northern mobs backed by
their elders and leaders,
dragged Igbos out of their
homes, vehicles and places
of business; and massacred
them. In all 30,000 people
were killed and the survivors
fled back to the East for their
safety. Northerners in the
East also left for the north in
fear of reprisal killings. This
ugly period of the nation’s
history has been dissected to
death but it must be
accepted as fact before this
festering wound – exposed
again by Achebe’s book –
can properly heal. Several
northern leaders – civilian
and military – of that era
have publicly apologized for
the actions of their citizens
but the Federal Government
has to issue an official
apology so that those who
try to distort history for their
own ends or to maintain a
false illusion can hold their
peace. True unity embraces
truth.
In that light, and after failed
attempts to renegotiate the
basis for existence, during
which the north attempted
to secede from Nigeria until
they were warned in dire
terms against that action (by
the British, who else?),
Easterners began to feel that
they were not welcome in
Nigeria. Again, it is irrelevant
whether or not this feeling
was genuine. There were
enough facts to support
either viewpoint. Emeka
Ojukwu, as governor of the
Eastern Region, made a
valiant – if selfish – attempt
to hold a sovereign
conference in Ghana but the
terms agreed to, were
reneged upon by the
Nigerian government when
they returned to Lagos. This
is what triggered the
declaration of Biafra and the
Civil War.
Before the war began,
Obafemi Awolowo visited the
East. His primary purpose
was to thank the people of
the region for their support
while he was incarcerated.
He also made his famous
speech, ending with a
promise that “if the Igbo
were to leave Nigeria, the
Yoruba would go along with
them”. No one knows
whether Awo was
equivocating or whether
when he returned to Lagos
(and saw the vast
opportunity left by the
fleeing Igbos), he changed
his mind. The same Awo
would later defend
starvation as a “necessary
element of war” while
overseeing the economic
blockade of the East and the
takeover of Igbo interests in
Lagos and the West by ‘sons
of the soil’. Was Awo
inherently evil? I don’t think
so, but how do we expect
the likes of Achebe, Madiebo
and other Igbo
commentators to view his
actions when they were
directly affected?
As a friend recently told me,
while skeptically dismissing
Achebe’s work, truth is the
first casualty in war. In light
of this very poignant truth, I
will not attempt to dissect
the war. Needless to say,
both sides could have
avoided it by diplomacy and
a desire to communicate,
problems that still beset the
country. It is on record,
however, that there was
widespread bombing of
villages and townships; an
economic embargo which
prevented much needed
food and supplies from
reaching many of the
million-plus people who died
of starvation/malnutrition;
and that there was at least
one documented case of
crimes against humanity in a
town outside Asaba. In this
event, several (up to 200)
men, women and children
were killed for their passive
support of Biafra’s cause.
Emma Okocha was a young
boy when his entire family
was killed and he wrote a
book, ‘Blood on the Niger’,
where this is captured in
gory detail. That’s as much
as I will say about the war.
Post-war, Igbos were given
twenty pounds per head
(regardless of their account
holdings at the start of the
war); property belonging to
the Igbo in Port Harcourt
was seized and given to
military officers and their
progeny. The army and
security forces were closed
to them as ‘secessionists’.
Until recently, there has
been a distinct lack of Igbo
in security positions, a factor
that is proportional to trust.
Godwin Kanu was the first to
sit on the Supreme Military
Council five years after the
war ended; Ike Nwachukwu
was the first to lead an army
division nearly twenty years
after the war (note that he
fought on the side of Nigeria
during the war) and only
recently have we seen Igbo-
speaking heads of the army,
police and defense.
Progress, yes. But does this
mean that Igbos were (and
are) not marginalized or
misunderstood? No.
There was an article written
several years ago by Sanusi
Lamido, now the CBN
Governor entitled “Igbo,
Yoruba and History”, in
which he used a lot of
stereotypical comments to
describe Igbos including his
belief that the Igbo had to
prove their loyalty and
accept the crumbs handed
out by Nigeria. He’s not the
only prominent Nigerian to
express such views.
Abdulsalami Abubakar
recently admitted to coercing
PDP delegates to choose
Obasanjo over Alex
Ekwueme as their
presidential candidate in
1998/1999 because he was
afraid Ekwueme wanted “to
form Biafra again”. The same
Ekwueme who had served as
Vice-President to a Northern
President in the 2nd
Republic nine years after the
civil war! These are singular
incidents, but they involve
public figures and
demonstrate the level of
distrust that defines the
relationship between the
Igbo and other Nigerians. A
casualty of war, perhaps, but
distrust all the same.
Several intellectual Igbo
youth – and I use the term
loosely – have risen up in
arms to accuse Achebe and
other Igbos of dredging up
history and of wanting to
bring back the dark days.
They swear that Igbo
disunity is the major issue
(no arguments from this
corner on that point) and
they insist that they are fully
integrated into society.
Some of them are the same
people who chuckle quietly
when ethnic jokes and
sketches are made by their
intellectual allies on social
media; others have business
interests to protect; others
still are in political alliances
that depend in great part on
being beholden to a
benefactor who is typically
non-Igbo. Most of them
speak Hausa and Yoruba
(admirable), but not their
own language. Some of them
vigorously insist on social
media that the Igbo have
never had a unified identity
(ergo, why should they?). In
other words, for an Igbo
man or woman to be
successful in Nigeria, they
cannot be seen as being ‘too
Igbo’.
Other Igbo, like this writer,
are saying “we are
Nigerians, but the country
must admit that a wrong was
done”. Nothing will speed up
the healing process faster. If
Gowon, the Nigerian Head of
State at that time, could
issue an apology thirty years
later for “atrocities”, surely
that is proof that they were
carried out. Even Murtala
Mohammed expressed
“regret”, if not an outright
apology, about some of his
methods during the war.
Continued denials and
revisions by analysts and
politically misguided youth
won’t change any of those
facts. Continued
“conversions” of Igbo youth
to the denial/soft-pedaling
camp will do no more than
hasten the decline of one of
the great tribes of Africa. It
is not a coincidence that
shame is the first step in the
path toward cultural
abandonment.
That era and its aftermath
are not the only times this
has happened in history.
Prior to the Second World
War, ‘Western Jews’ (from
Austria, Germany and France
in particular) were
dismissive of ‘Eastern Jews’
who were flooding into
those countries from Eastern
Europe. The Western Jews
thought their Eastern cousins
were dirty, too traditional
and an embarrassment.
Decades later, a man named
Adolf Hitler showed that he
didn’t care where they were
from – Jews were ‘a cancer’
and needed to be
eliminated. At that time, it
was the Eastern Jews in the
West, with their acutely
honed survival skills, who
helped many Western Jews
outlast a period that was
alien to them. They were
also the ones – mostly – who
carried on the legacy of
survival and history to the
modern Israel State.
History is important because
it teaches us lessons, not
because we want to go back
in time. The Igbo have a
proud heritage and history.
It is important that this is
not sacrificed at the altar of
appeasement and a
misdirected desire for what
passes as Nigerian
integration.
Nnaziri Ihejirika, a
Professional Engineer, writes
from Canada.

Follow him on twitter
@nnaziri

#CONSENSUS 2015