Government and Boko Haram By CHIDINELU OKERAFOR

No one thought it was ever going to
happen. Given the stiff-necked
positions that the violent religious
sect, called Boko Haram, had taken
before now, many Nigerians saw
nothing other than a prolonged war
of attrition between the militant
organisation and the Federal
Government.
When Dr. Reuben Abati, the
President’s special adviser on media
and publicity, confirmed reports that
the government had indeed,
commenced negotiations with
representatives of Boko Haram, not
many people could be taken by
surprise. Days ahead of Abati’s
admission, Boko Haram had made an
apparent U-turn in their hitherto
intransigent posture, when they
declared themselves open to
conditional talks with the Federal
Government.
Some Nigerians have criticised Dr.
Jonathan’s decision to follow the path
of dialogue with the sect, despite the
hellish state of affairs they have
inflicted on large sections of the
country. However, the government
can also argue, with some
justification, that the approach of
both the stick and carrot has borne
fruits. Were it not so, then, why did
it take the capture or arrest of a
number of the organisation’s top
leaders for the movement to turn
around in support of negotiations?
The now-established link between
the sect and some highly respected
northern politicians is also
instructive. Could it be that the
hardworking Nigerian military and
intelligence service are now close to
uncovering the main kingpins behind
the Boko Haram insurgency? In that
regard, according to some, the only
logical, if not rational, way to go, as
far as Boko Haram and their main
backers are concerned, might be to
adopt negotiations as precursor to
some for of soft landing. So many
hue and cry have understandably
trailed the latest reports of talks
between the two sides.
No one knows who next or what
group or part of the country will want
to trigger another insurgency, since
groups, like MEND and Boko Haram,
have tried it and seem to have
prevailed. But, let Nigerians just take
a hard look at how large parts of the
country’s Northern Region have
turned into a virtual Afghanistan
within just three years. In fact, the
first time this year President
Goodluck Jonathan addressed this
worried nation was Sunday, January
8, or thereabout.
That was on the eve of the
nationwide industrial action
spearheaded by the Nigeria Labour
Congress and the Trade Union
Congress, in response to the
controversial January 1, 2012
petroleum subsidy removal. The
president’s television speech was,
perhaps, primarily, designed to
dissuade labour and Nigerian’s from
going ahead with the strikes and
protests. But, also, Jonathan was
forced to admit, during the same
address, that his government, and
indeed, the country, were already on
the verge of being submerged by a
security challenge such as the
Nigerian state had not experienced
since the civil war years.
Yes! Boko Haram has so far caused
the deaths of over 5,000 Nigerian
civilians and security forces
personnel in parts of the North since
New Year’s Day. When in the year
2009 the people of this country first
heard and read about the Boko
Haram, they’d probably decided that
it was and had to be just a mere re-
enactment of the ad hoc religious
sects of years gone by, which sprang
up to inflict an intermittent reign of
terror in the north, only to be put
down by armed force. During the
era of d the Maitatsine religious
disturbances, back in the 1980’s and
nineties, the terrorists weren’t this
organised, nor were they this well-
armed or trained.
They were suspected mostly to have
infiltrated the country from
neighbouring Chad and Niger
Republic, and crucially, they didn’t
fight with Kalashnikovs, R.P.G.’s
advanced telecommunications
gadgets, machine guns or improvised
explosive devices, I.E.D’s. Their
weapons of war were mainly bows
and arrows, hunting guns, daggers,
knives, axes and machetes. Even
though they could and did kill people
in large numbers, they were no
match for the regular army. Back
then, the government of the day
treated their violent agitations as
mere “religious riots”, which they
quickly put down. Well, did anyone
expect the threat from Boko Haram
to have been different?
Astonishingly, the answer is “no.”
For some ridiculous reasons,
Nigerians first thought that Boko
Haram was like the business of old.
Some Nigerians forgot, rather
horrendously, that after the
militarisation of the Niger-Delta by
elements, like MEND, or Movement
for the Emancipation of the Niger-
Delta, people now knew how to arm
themselves with the most
sophisticated weaponry available
anywhere. It was just a question,
and is just a case, of securing
funding, arranging your smuggling
networks, acquiring collaborators
from among the army. Intelligence
services or the police, securing
training bases outside or within the
country, and you’re set to take on
even the world’s most professional
military.
If, in recent decades, this kind of
terrorist violence has been applied to
great effect in the Middle East, Asia
and in South America, then who says
Nigeria can be immune? Back to that
nationally televised speech by the
President. Even those 10 months
back, it was as if Jonathan was hinting
on the impossibility of an outright
military victory, because he, rather
plainly, told Nigerians the truth: that
the threat posed by Boko Haram
militancy was beginning to have a
crippling effect on the country.
That was nothing new. But, then, he
shocked some of his audience by
proceeding to say that the terrorist
organization “has infiltrated” the
armed forces and even the
government he leads. That is mind-
boggling to say the least, because,
obviously, the organization would
have infiltrated the police as well,
and how painful and scary it can be
to hear the President of the Federal
Republic and commander-in-chief of
the Nigerian armed forces saying it
in the open, and for the records, that
there are now Boko Haram members
in the judiciary, the executive and
the legislature, as well? The
President did draw an obvious
conclusion from what he said were
hard facts.
This phenomenon is now
complicating efforts to stamp out the
threat, which is steadily growing into
an all-out insurgency. He didn’t stop
there. He even drew parallels
between the threat posed to the
nation during the civil war years,
from 1967 to 1970, and what we now
have in the north of the country. His
conclusion was chilling. He said the
Boko Haram “insurgency” is a more
serious problem than that posed by
Biafra separatism in the South East.
It’s difficult to say why President
Jonathan said what he said. Was he
admitting that the state was losing
the war in the north?
Was he trying to instill fear in the
citizenry, in order that the ire of
Nigerians might be diverted from the
deregulation fiasco, which in itself
represented an unprecedented public
rejection of any government policy in
Nigeria since independence?
Perhaps, the commander-in-chief
was preparing a weary and angry
nation for the negotiations that have
now reportedly taken off. Maybe, he
was just reaching out to his own
supporters wherever they were:
bringing it to their attention, perhaps,
that even the powerful Federal
Executive Council, or FEC, over which
he’s presided since late 2009, could
also be brimming with Boko Haram
members or sympathizers or ardent
followers.
It’s true that government’s decision
to enter into a dialogue with a group
that has killed so many and
destroyed so much may not have
been a very popular one. Besides,
the debate about whether or not the
Federal Government had, earlier in
November, gone into negotiations
with just one faction of the
organisation remains alive. To make
matters worse, there seems to be no
clear-cut objective(s) that Boko
Haram is pursuing. Its leadership
proves adroit at shifting the goal post
at the slightest opportunity.
Originally, those leaders said they
abhorred “Western education and
influences.”
Later, Nigerians were treated to a set
of other demands, including,
frighteningly, the islamisation of the
entire north of the country. When
that couldn’t materialise, they’ve now
set about a kind of systematic ethnic
cleansing, which in other words boils
down to using violence and the
sectarian differences among
Nigerians as a weapon to drive non-
natives in the North out of that
region. The dangerous dimension to
the entire crisis is in its religious
coloration. So, what next? Should
the government keep alive the so-
called carrot approach, even if that
resulted in splintering Boko Haram?
Is it not worth taking some time to
try to establish what they really want?
Certainly, their grievance must
transcend the cold-blooded murder
of their former leader, Mohammed
Yusuf, in 2010. As painful and as
unwelcome as it surely is, talking to
these people, if they can be
identified, is both desirable and
useful. Their guerrilla tactics, for
one, have caught, and may continue
to catch, the security forces on the
wrong foot. Even the most
professional armies of the world,
with all their counter-terrorism
training and experience, have not
made so much headway, and the
Nigerian security structure cannot be
expected to fare any better.
Apart from the recurrent problem of
poor training and under-funding, the
country’s security apparatus, like
every other institution of state, is
incredibly riddled with corruption. If
the executive, the police, the armed
forces, the national assembly, the
judiciary have, as Mr. President has
warned, been infiltrated by a
dangerous organisation like Boko
Haram, then, who is there to fight
and defeat them militarily?
Confronting them exclusively by
military means will only harden, not
just their resolve, but will almost
certainly polarise and poison the
sentiments of the mass of Nigerians
in the north.
If that happens and when that
happens, the Nigerian state will find
itself fighting, not just one terrorist
organisation, but, also a population
that has been heavily infiltrated and
indoctrinated. It’s easy to
understand where those against
holding talks with Boko Haram are
coming from. It may sound like the
equivalent of condoning murder and
destruction and blackmail.
But, the almighty truth is: the threat
they pose to Nigeria’s corporate
existence is by far greater than the
face that the government may lose
by seeming to kowtow to them.
Besides, if negotiations have worked
in bringing a large measure of peace
to the Niger-Delta, then, let’s also try
it in the North. •

Okerafor lives in
Lagos. 07036776571.

#CONSENSUS 2015