Beyond President Jonathan’s War On Terror By Baba Aye

President Jonathan has brought
the “war on terror” to Nigeria by
waging war on the people in the
North East. Fighter jets, helicopters,
armoured personnel carriers and
thousands of soldiers have been
deployed there to enforce a state of
emergency in Borno, Yobe and
Adamawa states, which he declared
on May 14. The ongoing
bombardment is supposedly in a bid
to curtail the attacks of Boko Haram
on lives and properties. This
situation of de facto martial law has,
and will result in a great number of
deaths and thousands of people
fleeing across the borders. At the
onset in May, it was near impossible
to get much information from within
the battle zone. But while the states
still remain shut down, including
mobile phones networks cut off, we
are beginning to have inkling of the
horrors of state emergency. Al
Jazeera’s exclusive footahe of what
it describes as “the silent war in
Nigeria”, due to the information
blackout shows the wicked killing of
women, men and other civilians, by
the army, going on behind the
emergency walls.
The army and Boko Haram have
killed approximately the same
number of peoples in recent years.
There was a serious massacre by
the army in Baga in April when
soldiers set fire to more than 2,000
houses and killed over 200 civilians.
Unleashing terror by the security
forces is no answer to Boko Haram.
Boko Haram is a symptom of
serious economic and social
problems and an indication of the
level of despair that many poor
people feel. Sending in the army will
result in many more deaths and
refugees. People within the local
communities are voting with their
feet and leaving the country to get
away from the army.
It is rather unfortunate that
otherwise reasonable activists and
citizens could in any way support
the state of emergency which entails
sending of armed thugs of the army
to create further terror in the North
East. But this action has acquired
some level of popularity amongst
Nigerians, leading even a number of
activists, radical groups and
“parties” to the conclusion that “it
should be supported”. The further
step of proscribing both Boko
Haram and Ansaru, on June 4 with
the enactment of the Terrorism
(Prevention) (Proscription Order)
Notice 2013, barely 24 hours after
the United States government placed
$7m as bounty on Boko Haram
leader, Abubakar Shekau’s head, has
equally been endorsed, even if less
enthusiastically, without considering
how this rather hollow banning of a
body that was never a legal entity
boils down to licking the boots of
American imperialism.
Few people support the tactic of
terror used by Salafi Jihadist groups
like the two being targeted by the
Federal Government. But, while their
method of crass terror cannot but
stand condemned, it stems from
frustration with a system where
poverty, starvation, hopelessness,
and avoidable deaths remain the lot
of the poor masses. But such terror
tactics: result in the slaying of poor
working people; constrains the
possibilities for workers self-
activity, and, as we now see; serves
as an “excuse” for the state to crack
down in the name of law and order.
But, the current repressive measures
of the state are in no way a panacea
for the excesses of Boko Haram and
its like.
Compounding the problem; on the
pathway to failure
The truth of the matter is that the
state’s “war on terror” rather than
resolving any of main problems
associated with the insurgency, only
compounds them. This is being
confirmed everyday thus far, as the
massive deployment of troops to the
three north eastern states, with the
curtailment of citizen’s rights which
is implicit in the imposition of a
state of emergency, has resulted in
more killings of innocent women,
men and children. Further, such
militaristic attempts at solving
fundamentalist insurgency are
doomed to fail in the long run,
because they do not grasp the
deeper causes of the problem.
The “rebellion” as President
Jonathan rightly puts it which is
being waged by armed Islamists has
its roots in the poverty and
deprivation that has been the
portions of millions of families.
While a few super-rich elite live
ostentatious lives, the mass of the
people are embroiled in poverty,
illiteracy and disillusionment.
The religious propaganda espoused
by doctrinaire militants like those
who lead groups such as Boko
Haram and Ansaru is echoed in the
minds of a cross section of
frustrated adherents that perceive
no other means, to bringing an end
to their sufferings. It is also
instructive to note, as even
President Jonathan and General
Ihejirika, the Chief of Army Staff
points out, that the insurgents have
support as well in high quarters,
including the government and the
army.
The futility of a state of emergency
formula has actually been shown by
the earlier declaration of such
across 15 Local Government Areas
situated in Borno, Niger, Plateau and
Yobe states in December 2011. The
efforts of the Joint Task Force in
these LGAs have resulted more in
extra-judicial killings than the
curbing of a prevailing state of
insecurity.
The army (and police) have killed
about as much persons as Boko
Haram has done. The Baga
massacre in April is clearly the
sharpest example of the
ruthlessness of the state, involving
the brutal killings of hapless
civilians. There have been several of
such cases even if on a lesser scale
since 2009 when the low intensity
war between the Nigerian state and
the Boko Haram sect commenced.
After the April massacre in Baga, the
Federal Government claimed that
only 30 persons were killed, as
against at least 200 civilians
indicated by international human
rights bodies. This shows what we
should expect more of, with this
state of emergency and
“proscription”; massacres and
denials.
The economic burden of this new
stage of the Boko Haram and co
versus Federal Government war is
being borne by poor and working
people across the country, as the
prices of foodstuffs rose
astronomically over the last few
weeks. In the last couple of years
the sect’s activities have resulted in
higher prices for foodstuffs and
livestock including tomatoes,
onions, beef and rams. A lot of
farmers have become more
circumspect in going to their
farmsteads for fear of their lives.
The number of trailers and long
lorries that used to bring agricultural
produce from the north down south
have dwindled due to security
considerations. This bad situation
took a turn for the worse after the
declaration of a state of emergency.
The prices of foodstuffs shot up
with a vengeance. Beef in particular
is becoming less affordable for the
poor as butchers in Kaduna, Lagos
and Enugu amongst other places cry
out that the price of cattle has risen
by over 100% in just two weeks.
But, perhaps despite the costs in
human lives and hardship that the
state of emergency heralds, a stop
could at last be put to the pervading
state of insecurity that led to it? This
might be what many Nigerians and
even radicals that see the situation
as a necessary “short term” solution
that could pave the way for long
term benefit for the working masses
believe. This seemingly benign
illusion is like the road of good
intentions that however leads only
to hell.
Leaving leprosy to treat eczema
The blatant face of war in the first
place, fails to address the root
causes of the insurgency. And these
root causes are far deeper and more
complex than the simplistic
conclusion of that they boil down to
“a failure of governance and
leadership”. Secondly as we have
seen with the “war on terror” state
of emergency of the United States in
Afghanistan and Iraq, such strong
arm tactics merely drive even the
moderate adherents into taking up
arms, and ignites flames of anger in
the minds of many a youth, leading
them to join the sect being
“persecuted”. Proscription of these
groups, which were never legal
bodies in the first place, will not
lead to their extinction. On the
contrary, they will be forced to work
more effectively underground, with
support from their allies (and
members) within the elite class.
It is not impossible that “Boko
Haram” (and Ansaru) as particular
groups are snuffed out militarily. But
if this unlikely eventuality happens,
dozens of “Boko Harams” (and
Ansarus) will rise in no time to take
their places. In fact, the emergence
of groups such as Ansaru and the
splinters within Boko Haram point at
this reality. The rise of these
“Jihadist” sects and the incidence of
religious crises in the past 35 years
reflect the arc of sharpening
systemic crises of capitalist
development in the country and
globally. It is impossible to properly
understand what Boko Haram
represents without situating it within
the context of this broader history.
Fundamentalism, violence and the
crises of capitalism
Religions and religious conflicts
have been some of the forms within
which deeper social, economic and
political struggles have always been
waged for centuries across several
lands. Irreverent interests and
demands get clothed in the more
revered garb of religion, with which
divine authority is assumed for
nonetheless profane things like how
society should be organised by
humankind. This religion-as-politics
has clothed progressive, reactionary
and contradictory social
movements. Such politics rise to the
fore in periods of social decline and
crisis, particularly when secular
organisations that could pursue the
kernel of their mixed up goals are
weak and do not wield much
influence amongst the masses, or
lack the ideological compass to
provide required leadership for the
rising poor, disposed people.
The pathway of emergence and
development of Boko Haram, Ansaru
and similar groups in several
countries goes way back to
1978-79, a moment that could be
considered as a turning point in
world history. The Iranian revolution
at that period started as a secular
uprising but ended with the
establishment of a theocratic state,
becoming a symbol for
fundamentalist Islamists. At that
same point in time, the rottenness of
the so-called “socialist” USSR
played itself out with its invasion of
Afghanistan. It was forced to retreat
in disgrace, as militant
fundamentalists from (mainly) Arab
countries such as Osama bin Ladin
flocked in to wage a Jihad against
the “infidel” “communists”. This was
with the active support of the United
States and other Western imperialist
countries that funded and trained
the Mujahedeen.
But 1978-79 did not mark a turn in
global capitalist development
because of the Iranian revolution or
the invasion of Afghanistan. These
were symptoms of a far deeper
crisis. The world economy had
entered a period of relentless decline
marked by perennial crises. The
elite class of bosses and their
governments could strive to
maintain (even if in futility as we
now see), some level of profitability
for big business only through
massive attacks on the rights and
living standards of the working
masses.
The weapon of that brutal striving
was neoliberalism, characterized as
“globalisation”. It involved and still
involves; privatisation, cuts in social
spending (for education, health care,
etc), and the liberalisation of
markets. Its programmatic
expressions came as “austerity
measures”, “structural adjustment
programmes”, NEEDS, NEPAD etc.
The apostles that heralded its creed
were Margaret Thatcher and Ronald
Reagan, with the Shagaris,
Babangidas, Obasanjos, and
Jonathans of this world as loyal
disciples of “the word” of Mammon,
which it propagates.
The suffering neoliberalism in
particular and capitalism in general
wrought and continues to foist on
the immense majority of the human
population first led to attempts at
coping by the increasing jobless
poor. We see this in the expanding
informal economy and marginalised
mass such as area boys, almajari,
and other street urchins that have
become ready tools for the devil of
riots. But as these coping strategies
continue to fail, resistance in
different forms began to take an
upturn on one hand, while the turn
to God for salvation also became
more profound on the other hand,
particularly (but not limitedly) in the
economically backward countries.
This is largely why there has been a
rise in religiousness across the
world over the last three decades. It
is not restricted to Islam, nor is it
restricted to religious crises. We
have seen the flourishing of
“prosperity churches” from Nigeria
to the Americas as well, for example.
As hope for a better world now
eludes more people courtesy of the
systemic crises of capitalism,
religion has become more and more
so, the hope of the hopeless in a
heartless world.
Religious violence as an expression
of religiousness has many sides to
it. Quite often, some people try to
reduce its expression to the Islamic
faith. This is arrant nonsense. Those
who fight their earthly battles in the
name of God, of many a faith have
at some time or the other been
armed prophets. Indeed a look at
the crusades shows the extent of
killings, plunder and pillage
perpetuated by Christian gentlemen.
And the inquisition tells of how
intolerance could be stoked to fever
high pitch to justify the most
unthinkable of horrors human
beings ever passed through.
Those are experiences that stretch
back to centuries, but we are talking
of now, the cynic might say. But the
reason why fundamentalist violence
has been more prominent with Salafi
Jihadist than with other (particularly
the Christian) faith’s armed
adherents lies in the conflation of
what is Western, and what is
Christian. While on one hand
upholding secularity, the
establishments in Western
imperialist countries actually
promote this same conflation with
their “cultural” narratives.
“In God we trust”, “for God and
country”, etc, are just a few of the
slogans such narratives use. Which
“God”? Is the word “God” simply
English for Allah, Olodumare or
Chineke? Does it not have a Judeo-
Christian connotation? These are
just a few questions that could
trouble the minds of a few of the
young men (and women) drawn into
militant Islamists groups that
identify America for example, as “the
big Satan”.
It is however worthwhile as Chris
Harman succinctly notes in “The
Prophet and the Proletariat”, to
keep in mind the fact that “most so
called Western values are not rooted
in some mythical European culture,
but arise out of the development of
capitalism over the last two
centuries” . “Western” values,
education and institutions as we
know them today are much more
representative of the capitalist
system in general than some
particular European past or nature.
The Nigerian face of a global
problem
Back to Nigeria, it is not accidental
that what seems to have become a
perennial state of “religious
conflicts” started also in the 1978.
This was with the Shari’a
controversy at the Constituent
Assembly which drafted the 1979
constitution. Four years later, the
most dreaded fundamentalist sect
before the Boko Haram organised
around Mallam Mohammed Marwa
aka Mai tatsine went on rampage in
Kano state. Since then,
“spontaneous” religious riots rocked
several northern states from time to
time. Several militant sects have
been formed, some collapsed, while
others, like El-zakzakky’s syncretist
Shi’ite group, became more
“responsible”.
It is noteworthy that the rather
moderate Shabaab Muslim Youth
Organisation was transformed into
the now dreaded Jamā’atu Ahlis
Sunnah Lādda’awatih wal-Jihad
(People Committed to the
Propagation of the Prophet’s
Teachings and Jihad), better known
as Boko Haram in 2001, on the
heels of the Al-Qaeda “9/11” attack
on the United States. Boko Haram
has now become the face of a
“global jihad” in Nigeria, and
equally the Nigerian face within the
global jihad.
It is rather naive as most socialist
groups do, to simply write off Boko
Haram and its corollaries as “right
wing” or “terror groups”, because of
their “reactionary activities”. This is
very much like failing to see the
woods for the trees. It is also
grossly inadequate to merely see the
elites behind Boko Haram and co as
their “sponsors”. Reality is much
more complex and full of
contradictions. The task for activists
who seek to change society is to
understand these contradictions and
the linkages between them with the
aim of furthering the enlightenment
of poor and working people on the
issues at stake and thus foster
qualitative intervention in history, as
much as possible.
The contradictory class nature of
Boko Haram and its ilk
Boko Haram, Ansaru and co, like
most of the new militant Islamist
sects that have blossomed in the
period of neoliberal globalism have
a contradictory nature. On one hand,
they involve sections of the ruling
elite for whom religion-as-politics is
a tool for mobilisation of mass
support for their aims. These
include electoral aims of winning
gubernatorial and other political
positions or as bargaining chips for
access to state power (and with it
the treasury). We saw examples with
the political Shari’a wave that swept
through twelve northern states in
the early 2000s. Specifically, it has
been established that Senator Ali
Modu Sheriff, courted Boko Haram
in his successful bid for the
governorship of Borno state in
2003. Apart from mass mobilisation,
Boko Haram supporters played the
role of armed hirelings not unlike
that which some Niger delta
“militants” played for Peter Odili
and co, that same year.
On the other hand, elements of the
anti-establishment demands of Boko
Haram and its sister organisations,
find resonance in the hearts of many
poor and dispossesed people within
their localities that are fed up with
the corruption and flamboyant
lifestyle of the elites, in the face of
their own poverty and hopelessness.
At the earlier point before it went
underground after the murder of its
founding leader, Boko Haram had
also aided the spread of its
ideology’s influence with social
work, very much like Hezbollah in
Lebanon. It had provided housing,
(Koranic) education, healthcare and
the offsetting of debts for hundreds
if not thousands of the wretched of
the earth, winning hearts and minds,
as much as souls to its standpoint.
While a nominal roll of Boko Haram
membership might not be something
we could secure, the group’s
membership including its armed
insurgents and unarmed supporters
cannot but be in the thousands, if
not tens of thousands, with a
significant proportion of these being
poor and working people. This
would dwarf the numbers of
“radical” or “revolutionary” groups
in the country added up together,
several times over, and could equal
the sizes of many a trade union.
Of course, the large presence of the
poor and oppressed people in an
organisation does not make it, pro-
workers, talk less of being
revolutionary. Fascist parties such
as the Nazis in Germany or
Mussolini’s National Fascist Party,
did have significant mass following
while pursuing anti-workers’
causes. It is also not being
suggested that Boko Haram is in
anyway a revolutionary or
“progressive” group.
Indeed, the sect must have lost a
considerable extent of whatever
goodwill it might have had before
2009, in the states where it
operates, haven become oppressive
with its tactic of terror. And few of
its adherents would have been
worker class. But only one-
dimensional thinking would sum all
these up to mean that the sect “is
nothing but a set of foot soldiers of
sections of the Nigerian ruling class
that went berserk” or worse still
conclude that “Boko Haram is part
and parcel of Nigerian ruling elite”.
This would at best be akin to
throwing away the baby with the
bathwater, rather than actually
understanding “the true face of Boko
Haram”. It could however be worse.
Radical “Islamism”, with associated
spontaneous and organised
violence, has come to stay as one of
the macabre symptoms of the period
we are living in i.e. where the
capitalist system has become a
putrid living-corpse holding down
the progress of human society, on
one hand, but the poor and working
class have not risen to consuming
the task of overthrowing it, due to
the weaknesses of revolutionary
forces’ influence within it.
In drawing lessons from the
particular, through the concrete
analysis of concrete reality, our
examination must have the power to
give us a general picture of what the
jigsaw pieces add up to.
At the centre of the multi-layered
class nature of Boko Haram and
similar groups, providing leadership,
is “the Islamism of the new middle
class” . This class of: former
students (most of whom were the
militant elements of the Muslim
Students Society); unemployed
secondary and higher school
graduates; teachers, nurses, and
other professionals, etc, “provide the
vital element which sustains
revivalist, political Islam” e.g. Boko
Haram and Ansaru. They risk life,
liberty and limbs to organise and
mobilise the working people drawn
to their ideology and establish the
links for funding from the elites
whom they can as well relate with.
The scandalous rate of youth
unemployment which official figures
put at between 45% and 60%,
nationally will feed Boko Haram and
its likes with cadres. Interestingly,
the National Bureau of Statistics
notes that the unemployment
situation in the north eastern region
is the worst across the country, with
Yobe state topping this socially
criminal list. Situate the anger from
emergency bombings and
bayoneting of loved ones, and you
get a keg of gunpowder which
would make what we have seen so
far with regards to political Islam’s
violence appear like child’s play in
the very near future.
The vacillatory nature of the middle
class in general is a matter of
critical importance for
understanding the possible tides
and ebbs of political Islam in
general, and the changing
dimensions of its tactics, which
emerge from struggles within in.
While being dispossessed by the big
money bags and corporations of the
elite class of rulers and condemning
this oppression, members of the
middle class aspire to become and
live like the “big men” even while
here on earth.
The lifestyle of Mohammed Yusuf,
during the first and more peaceful
phase of Boko Haram’s life, presents
a very vivid example. He cruised
around Maiduguri in the latest SUVs
and his children attended the best
private schools, despite his scathing
criticisms of the ostentatious and
supposedly sinful-Western lifestyles
of the “godless” rich elites.
The crux of the matter here is that
as political Islamists sects grow in
size and influence there is a
tendency for them to become co-
opted into the ruling class’
establishment. They become more
“respectable” even when they
maintain some verbiage anti-
establishment rhetoric. Ibrahim
Yaqoub El Zakzaky and his Islamic
Movement of Nigeria is an example,
as pointed out earlier, of this
trajectory of most Salafi Jihadist
groups like Boko Haram. But what
tends to happen is that new and
more virulent groups emerge and
grow to replace those sects that
have become laundered.
On one hand, the drama of an
amnesty carrot which preceded the
emergency stick of a war on terror
is a long-winded reflection of this
tendency for yesterday’s radical
leaders of political Islamist sects to
become today’s responsible, even if
still fire-spitting cleric. On the other
hand, it represents the fears of
sections of the elite, particularly
those within firing distance of the
sects’ guns, to save their hides.
Between the tactic of amnesty and
that of repression
There appeared to have been a
series of inconsistencies over
negotiations with Boko Haram. At
the beginning of March President
Jonathan had declared that he
could not negotiate, talk less of
grant amnesty to “ghosts”. Before
that month was over, he had
initiated the process for granting
amnesty to members of the same
phantom, Boko Haram. And in April
whilst the members of the amnesty
committee where still holding their
first series of meetings with
suspected Boko Haram lynchpins in
jails, supporters of the sect were
routed out of Baga with the
“collateral damage” of a massacre.
This “inconsistency”, actually holds
a thread of consistency. It is not
merely about the fickleness of a
president who turned to be a lion
overnight as many now hail him to
be. Rather, it is about contending
interests and views amongst
different sections of the elite on the
way forward in “resolving” the
problem Boko Haram and co posed,
for their rule and the interests of
their pay masters in Washington,
London, Brussels, etc. The unity of
Nigeria is related to this concern, to
the extent that it means the
continually negotiated unity of the
ruling elite despite whatever other
differences they have, to exploit the
resources and labour of the
oppressed poor and working people.
Within this “consistency” we also
find lies and half truths, hiding the
immediate interests and fears of the
contending elite power blocs, and
Boko Haram alike. It is instructive to
note that (a faction of) the sect had
called for dialogue on November 1,
asking for General Muhammad
Buhari, to serve as mediator. The
government turned down the offer
(and Buhari also extricated himself),
only to sneakily meet with the group
a few weeks later in Senegal, with
the Senegalese and Malian
governments playing “significant
roles” in facilitating the meeting. But
obviously no resolutions were
reached. Neither Boko Haram nor
the FGN have been bold enough to
even give any inkling of what
transpired.
It is quite conceivable that the quest
for dialogue at different times by
first, a faction of the sect and later,
the FGN aided by its ECOWAS class
mates was spurred by fear. Boko
Haram’s “offer” came in the wake of
a barrage of onslaughts against its
members. The ECOWAS states that
intervened were also obviously
bothered by the spread into (as in
the case of Senegal) or deepening
(as Mali eventually played out) of
armed Islamist politics into their
territories.
But the clearest expression of fear
leading to the shared quest for
dialogue can be found in the call for
amnesty, and current lamentations
of conservative groups like the
Northern Elders Forum at how the
state of emergency jeopardizes any
hope for peaceful resolution of the
Boko Haram and co dilemma. The
clarion for an amnesty, was first
raised on January 30, by Alhaji
Muhammad Sa’ad Abubakar III, the
Sultan of Sokoto, who is considered
as the Amir-ul-Momineen i.e. leader
of the Moslem faithfuls. A more
prestigious religious leader cannot
be found to speak out on the
predicament Islamist insurgency has
thrown the country into.
His call was immediately after a
faction of Boko Haram had indicated
its willingness to dialogue. But more
importantly, this was just days after
(probably another faction of) the
group had attempted to kill the
highly revered Emir of Kano, Alhaji
Ado Bayero. Earlier in July 2012,
attempts had also been made on the
life of the Shehu of Borno, Mustafa
Ibn Umar El-Kanemi. These three
hereditary rulers represent the apex
of traditional and spiritual reverence
in “the North”, and it would have
been unthinkable at a time that
anyone could even conceive of
laying a hand on any of them.
Shock at such impudence has given
way to the self-preservation instinct.
The strident call for amnesty which
now waxes stronger amongst
“Northern elders”, including those of
the Northern Elders Forum and the
Arewa Consultative Forum is simply
put, to save their hides. This also
explains why some Emirs, outside
the immediate locales of the state of
emergency, such as Alhaji Umar
Farouk Umar of Daura have resisted
house-to-house searches for Boko
Haram adherents in their domains,
while asserting that; “we traditional
rulers are the custodians of the
people and are ready to support and
cooperate with security agents with
a view to achieving a common
goal”, and then going ahead to
lambast the Federal Government for
failing to address the problems of
unemployment and insecurity,
because it is corruption-ridden.
While fear propels the “pro-
amnestyists”, electoral hope drives
those behind the stick. One cannot
but see some semblance between
GEJ and “GWB” of the “United
States of (some parts of) North
America”. Neither was actually ever
considered to be bright as much, but
like George Walker Bush after that
“9/11”, Goodluck Jonathan’s
calculation of emerging as a
conquering lion of whichever tribe in
the north east, is central to the
battle he has surreptitiously started
to wage all over Nigeria, for a
second term, come 2015. But he
might not be so dense as to imagine
that the force of arms alone would
win him either of the wars i.e.
against Boko Haram and for a return
to Aso Rock.
This explains why the amnesty
committee is still going about
holding genteel meetings with Boko
Haram adherents in jail, and
scouring the support of Emirs and
other leaders in the northern states
for the amnesty programme, and not
the state of emergency which had
been presented to them as a fait
accompli.
Those that for whatever naive or
mischeivously self-serving reasons
chastise the FGN for waiting so long
to decisively intervene with the
emergency stick in the states now
under martial rule lose sight or
choose not to see a simple fact,
consideration about the lives of the
poor and working people or
“national security” are secondary to
the political calculations of
President Jonathan. What is
uppermost to him and the sections
of the elite he represents is the
laurel of 2015, and with it, of course,
the booty of access to the treasury
that goes with it.
In lieu of a conclusion; what is to be
done?
Perspectives are of little use if they
do not serve practice, and become
shaped through the application of
theory to practice. As an axiom goes
“practice is the sole criterion for
truth”. But then, quite often when we
ask the question “what is to be
done?” we fail to also ask; “by
who?” and “why?” When change-
seeking radicals fail to ask these
further questions, or fail to critically
think through their answers to them,
it is not difficult to fall into such
effusions like those of a leading
cadre of the “Democratic Party for
Socialist Reconstruction”
groupuscule. I was shocked when
shortly after the state of emergency
was declared I read in his statement
that “for once, the president has
acted like the Commander In Chief
of the Armed Forces”, in a face book
posting that also called for support
for this imposition of martial law!
Whose armed forces and
“commander in chief” for which
class’ interest?
The war being waged by the FGN
against Boko Haram is not in the
interest of the poor and working
people. Similarly, while it would be
grossly inadequate to simply
consider the sect or militant
Islamists in general as being
“reactionary”, elements, working
class activists cannot support the
sect and its tactics of terror. Can the
answer to this be a form of support,
critical or otherwise for the Federal
Government and its declaration of
martial law (which is what a state of
emergency amounts to) in the north
east?
The clear answer must be NO! The
exercise of “law and order” in
moments of crisis is meant to
safeguard the rule of an obsolete
class in general, and the interests of
its obdurate section which wields
power on behalf of the class as a
whole, in particular. While we could
be flexible with tactics, we must be
firm in standing by principles if we
are not to lose focus in the struggle.
In principle, working class activists
have to be against any form of
“state of emergency” and the
curtailment of democratic rights of
the poor and working people. One
does not have to be a revolutionary
to understand this. I was particularly
impressed, for example by the May
17 condemnation of “Declaration Of
State Of Emergency As A Set Back
For Nigeria’s Democracy”, by Nelson
Ejujumi of the Centre for Rights and
Grassroots Initiative (CRGI), from a
liberal democratic perspective on
the Sahara Reporters website .
What then is to be done, by the
working class? In principle, it is apt
to call for the establishment of
workers’ self-defence militias. But
while this is possible as the
situation in the region assumes new
dynamics (for we are seeing the
unfolding of a new phase in the
matter at hand), the combined
suffocation of Boko Haram’s non-
state terror and the Federal
Government’s institutional state
terror makes that illusory at the
moment.
To expect the trade union
bureaucracy to rise up to the
challenge of posing an alternative of
workers’ power to both forms of
terror is as well akin to expecting
tigers to eat grass. In fact, the
Nigeria Labour Congress and Trade
Union Congress on one hand threw
their weights behind the amnesty
process during the last May day and
on the other hand organised a rally
for “peace and unity” which was
attended carnival-like by
representatives of the Federal
Government in September last year.
We thus seem caught between the
anvil and a hard place. But this is
when we restrict our understanding
of the labour movement to the trade
union bureaucracy. This bureaucracy
occupies a central, yet ambiguous
place in the working class
movement. Revolutionary change
can be brought about only through
the self-activity of the working class
from below. Further, the working
class will not come to self-
consciousness as a whole, at once,
particularly in the immediate
instance.
There is a ray of hope from below
within and beyond the north east,
which I can attest to. I had the
opportunity to visit two of the states
now under martial rule, barely a year
ago, to supervise the NLC State
Level Schools. It was a very
pleasant surprise for me to witness
the discussions from the floor, as I
quietly took my seat without much
ceremony at the back of the class,
on each occasion. In an average
class of fifty persons half in both
instances belonged to the Labour
Party, but equally felt frustrated by
its politics, and were of the view
that its standoffishness from a
working class viewpoint is what
allows groups like Boko Haram to
thrive.
As I pointed out on the two
occasions, this poses the challenge
of building both within and beyond
the Labour Party from below. In the
particular instance that now
confronts us, intensifying work
within the labour movement entails
agitation and propaganda work
within the states where the “war on
terror” now rages. Of course, this is
not to suggest limiting such work by
revolutionary groups to these states.
But if we are to go beyond merely
mouthing principles like the need for
workers’ self-defence in the
unfolding period, at the risk of life,
limbs and liberty, leaflets, posters,
graffiti, newspapers etc must, find
their way behind the enemy lines of
the gendarmes. This would be
difficult, but can be done, and has to
be done.
The various international
dimensions of the struggle at hand
also have to be taken into
consideration. The Baga massacre
where a quarter of a century-old
multilateral defence pact was
exhumed for Nigerien, Chadian and
Nigerian soldiers to join forces in
killing defenceless citizens, points at
one aspect of the elite’s
international collaboration. The
other key aspect is that Jonathan’s
war on terror is a subset of the
broader Washingtonian “war on
terror”, with its murderous pathway
which Manning Bradley and
wikileaks helped confirm with words
and tapes from the horse’s stables.
The Islamist insurgents equally have
their own “internationalist”
dimension. Boko Haram has issued
a clarion call for its “comrades” in
Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq,
amongst other places to join it in
repulsing the state’s terror. Thus far,
this does not seem to have
materialised. But as the plot
thickens, it is to be expected that
the ante of several forms of
international support for it, including
technical and financial ones would
be upped. Indeed, Boko Haramists
themselves have received training
and/or fought alongside other
Islamist insurgents in Somalia,
Mauritania, Mali, etc. Links and
relationships would have been built
in the course of this that could
facilitate the sect’s appeal receiving
fruitful responses.
Internationalism is, traditionally and
contemporaneously, much more at
the heart of working class politics
than those of the elite or militant
Islamists. The struggle for
revolutionary transformation in
Nigeria is part and parcel of the
working class and oppressed strata
for a better world. We saw two sides
of this internationalism during the
January revolts, last year.
On one hand, in the classical sense
of working class internationalism
trade unions, socialist organisations
and other progressive groups took
action in support of the struggle in
Nigeria, just as has been the case
with the sparks of revolts in Greece,
Mexico, Spain, Chile, Italy, Portugal,
United States, South Africa, and now
Turkey, and of course as was the
case with the revolutions in the
Middle East and North Africa.
On the other hand, Nigerians in the
diaspora marched on Nigerian
embassies, heckled government
functionaries and generally spoke
out against oppression and
repression in their home country.
The two hands clapped together, as
working class and other radical
activists fought besides Nigerians in
the diaspora, on the side of the
uprising.
The January Uprising also showed
us how superfluous ethno-religious
conflicts could become when social-
economic issues are placed squarely
at the centre of the political struggle
for a better society. It could be
recalled that Boko Haram had
issued an order for non-northerners
to vacate those parts of the country,
just before the working masses
shock the country to its foundations
with an 8-day general strike and
mass protests across some 57 cities
and towns in the country, with
demonstrations in support of the
revolts in almost all continents.
It was in the heat of such a moment
that working people did establish
self-defence militias in places like
Zaria and Dutse, which guarded
churches during their services,
against Boko Haram and its like.
Boko Haram was forced to play to
the populist gallery, threatening to
bomb the NLC office because the
trade union federation betrayed the
people by calling off the mass strike.
This leads us, in conclusion, to what
I see as the way forward, in a way
and manner that links the current
dilemma with the entire pursuit of
our struggle for system change and
a better lot for the working class as
the master of its own destiny.
The point of departure on this
matter, as we see it is that: we
cannot support either the
institutional terror of the Nigerian
state, nor can we support the non-
state group of Boko Haram and co.
From a working class standpoint, we
would say, we stand for “neither the
FGN state of emergency or Boko
Haram insurgency”.
Such an approach is not new as the
correct line, in or out of Nigeria. We
stood for neither Washington nor
Moscow during the “cold war”, as
workers were exploited and
oppressed in both the Western
“democracies” and the Eastern
“socialist” states.
We were also not alone in taking a
“neither MKO nor IBB/Abacha”
position during the June 12
revolution. Further, when the world
rose to “stop the war” in Iraq a
decade back, it was not because the
international working class
supported Saddam Hussein. While
the war was not stopped, it threw up
one of the largest mobilisation of
international resistance in a
generation, serving as a part-
template of sorts, for subsequent
struggles that are ongoing.
But our argument would not be
complete by only grasping what, in
summary, we are against. What we
stand for should as well be clear
flowing from this, and it should
firmly grasp what the key link in the
chain is at the moment. A state of
emergency is equal to the de facto
imposition of martial rule. The FGN
is deemed to be of a democratic
republic. We have the right to
demand an end to the state of
emergency. This is particularly so,
as it has no specified time limit.
The most urgent task at this hour
might be the establishment of a
united front to stop the state of
emergency. There are several social
forces that are against the state of
emergency for diverse reasons.
While collaboration with as broad a
spectrum of these forces as is
possible could be pursued, pro-poor
people activists must stamp the
focus of a working class standpoint
on such a possible platform. The
Joint Action Front (JAF) of pro-
working class civil society
organisations might be best suited
to take up the challenge of pursuing
this cause.

Baba Aye
Abuja
June 7, 2013