“I Was Right”: How One Prediction About Trump and Middle East Peace Came True

When i predicted that Donald J. Trump’s return to the White House would bring an end to the Israel–Palestine conflict, many treated it as wishful thinking. But in the wake of the sweeping cease-fire and the historic Gaza settlement brokered in October 2025, that forecast looks remarkably prescient. What follows is a compact account of how long-failed peace initiatives set the stage, what changed under the new U.S. administration, and why the current accord—messy and imperfect as it is—offers real, mutual benefits to both Israelis and Palestinians.

A long history of hope, and failure

For three decades the peace process has produced more plans than peace. The Oslo Accords of the 1990s created the architecture of interim Palestinian self-rule and promised final-status talks, but they stalled on the core issues of borders, Jerusalem, refugees and settlements. That failure left both sides frustrated and a generation skeptical of negotiated solutions.

The 2000 Camp David summit under U.S. auspices also failed to bridge the gap between Israeli and Palestinian positions; mutual mistrust and disputes over Jerusalem and territory scuttled a final deal and were followed by renewed violence. Later initiatives—Annapolis in 2007, the 2008 Olmert–Abbas talks, and other efforts—each collapsed for a mix of political weakness, leadership turnover, and deeply asymmetrical positions on the “core issues.”

The consequence: incremental confidence-building measures (and, in 2020, the Abraham Accords that normalized relations between Israel and several Arab states) helped regional ties but did not solve the Israeli–Palestinian core dispute. The Abraham Accords showed the value of U.S.-brokered diplomacy and regional incentives, but they sidestepped the Palestinians’ political claims—leaving a final settlement unresolved.

Trump’s posture: from campaigning rhetoric to a new negotiating formula

During his 2024–25 campaign and early months back in office, Trump repeatedly framed his foreign-policy pitch around ending “forever wars” and forcing adversaries and partners to make concrete bargains rather than continue open-ended military engagements. Observers noted his anti-war rhetoric and his willingness to use unconventional pressure and incentives to produce deals.

That posture translated into a broad, high-stakes approach in 2025: intense shuttle diplomacy, leveraging relationships with Gulf partners who had already normalized with Israel, a regional summit hosted by Egypt to codify the cease-fire terms, and direct pressure on militant actors to disarm as part of a phased transition of Gaza governance. These moves combined coercive pressure, diplomatic carrots, and wide buy-in from regional players—ingredients absent from many prior efforts. Reporting on the October 2025 arrangements highlighted a cease-fire, phased Israeli withdrawals from large parts of Gaza, prisoner/hostage exchanges, and plans for a technocratic interim administration and reconstruction aid—measures designed to stabilize the ground while political work proceeds.

What’s different this time? (A practical blend of incentives and guarantees)

Three pragmatic differences give the 2025 accord a fighting chance:

1. Regional buy-in and normalization leverage. The Gulf states and Egypt—whose ties with Israel have grown stronger since the Abraham Accords—now provide economic and political incentives (reconstruction funding, trade, diplomatic recognition) that make a cease-fire and Gaza rehabilitation more attractive than continued conflict. The 2020 Accords demonstrated how regional normalization can reshape incentives; 2025 builds on that architecture but redirects some of the payoff toward Palestinian reconstruction and governance.
2. Phased, enforceable security guarantees. Previous talks often sketched final outcomes without credible enforcement. The recent deal ties demilitarization steps and disarmament commitments to measurable benchmarks—hostage releases, weapons collection, and on-the-ground monitoring—backed by an international (and regionally led) verification mechanism. That mix of phased obligations, external monitoring, and conditional reconstruction funds increases the cost of backsliding.
3. A technocratic, transitional governance model for Gaza. Rather than an immediate political transfer that would invite renewed power struggles, the accord calls for a phased handover to a technocratic authority—one with international oversight and a mandate to rebuild services, restore rule of law, and prepare the institutions needed for eventual political arrangements. That pragmatic interim approach reduces the zero-sum stakes of immediate sovereignty battles.

How the accord benefits Israel and the Palestinians

No agreement can erase decades of grievance overnight. But the 2025 framework offers tangible near-term and longer-term benefits:

For Israel: reduced cross-border attacks and rocket fire; the return of hostages and closure for affected families; strengthened security cooperation with regional partners; and a political pathway that tempers the pressure for indefinite military occupation while preserving key security buffers through verified demilitarization.

For Palestinians (Gaza and the West Bank): emergency humanitarian relief and a large reconstruction package funded by Gulf states and international donors; reconstruction of critical infrastructure (power, water, hospitals); restoration of movement and trade that can jump-start the economy; and a roadmap toward greater Palestinian administrative control and eventual political negotiations backed by international guarantees.

Taken together, these gains create space for a durable political solution where daily survival and economic opportunity reduce incentives for violence—exactly the pragmatic, incremental payoff that many previous initiatives lacked.

Risks and open questions

The agreement is not bulletproof. Key risks include spoilers on the ground (armed factions refusing to disarm), political instability in Israel or Palestinian leadership that could reverse commitments, and the perennial unresolved questions over Jerusalem and refugees. Success will require patient international engagement, robust verification, and continued pressure—diplomatic and economic—on actors tempted to derail the process.

Why My prediction wasn’t fanciful

My forecast hinged on two linked insights: first, that Trump’s anti-war posture and transactional negotiating style would push for quick, visible results rather than open-ended talks; and second, that the regional realignment begun in 2020 (the Abraham Accords) could be repurposed as leverage for Palestinian relief and political progress. The 2025 path fused both ideas: an administration determined to produce a deal, and a regional set of partners willing to bankroll outcomes that stabilize Israel’s neighborhood while aiding Palestinians. In short, the political climate and leverage architecture that made a breakthrough possible were in place—what I predicted was not a miracle but the logical endpoint of those converging forces.

Conclusion: imperfect peace, practical gains

History should temper triumphalism. The 2025 accord is not a final solution to every historical grievance, but it is a practical, enforceable pause that buys lives, rebuilds cities, and creates institutional space for deeper negotiations. If this framework holds—and that is a big if—it will show that combining regional normalization, enforceable security benchmarks, and large-scale reconstruction can produce measurable peace dividends. For those who bet against the possibility of progress, My prediction is a reminder that geopolitical dynamics can shift quickly—and that, sometimes, realism paired with pressure and incentives can produce outcomes once thought impossible.